The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, passed by Congress in 2010 largely in response to the financial crisis, created the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; among other provisions, it limits proprietary trading by banks, changes the way swaps are traded, and curtails the use of credit ratings. The effects of Dodd–Frank remain a matter for speculation; more than half of the regulatory rulemaking called for in the bill has yet to be completed. In this book, experts on Dodd–Frank and financial regulation—academics, regulators, and practitioners—discuss the ways that the law is likely to succeed and the ways it is likely to come up short.
Placing their discussion in the broader context of regulatory issues, the contributors consider banking reform; the regulation of derivatives; the Volcker Rule, and whether or not banks should be forced to stop proprietary trading; the establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and possible flaws in its conception; the law and “too-big-to-fail” institutions; mortgage reform, including qualification requirements and securitization; and new disclosure requirements regarding CEO compensation and conflict minerals.
Paul H. Schultz is John and Maude Clarke Professor of Finance at the University of Notre Dame.
James R. Barth, Jeff Bloch, Mark A. Calabria, Charles W. Calomiris, Shane Corwin, Cem Demiroglu, John Dearie, Amy K. Edwards, Raymond P. H. Fishe, Priyank Gandhi, Thomas M. Hoenig, Christopher M. James, Anil K Kashyap, Robert McDonald, James Overdahl, Craig Pirrong, Matthew Richardson, Paul H. Schultz, David Skeel, Chester Spatt, Anjan Thakor, John Walsh, Lawrence J. White, Arthur Wilmarth, Todd J. Zywicki